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INTRODUCTION
During the 2017 Supreme Court Term, the Justices heard two cases on partisan gerrymandering that most of them probably would have preferred to avoid. The 414 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:413 summary affirmance on the merits, which lower courts likely would have considered to have at least some precedential value. Instead, the Court took a middle ground in Gill and Benisek, hearing them on the merits but providing little guidance on the doctrine of partisan gerrymandering beyond saying in Gill that plaintiffs must demonstrate individual harm from a map in a specific district. 12 The Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing for their statewide challenge but otherwise provided no analysis on the appropriate standard for a partisan gerrymandering claim. 13 Justice Kagan, concurring for herself and three other Justices in Gill, offered a roadmap for plaintiffs looking to bring a successful claim in the future.
14 Her proffered analysis can help the doctrine evolve for the next partisan gerrymandering case-which the Court will once again be forced to consider on direct appeal. But the per curiam opinion in Benisek, affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction against Maryland's map, provides no help at all to future cases because it rested on purely procedural grounds. 15 In fact, the Benisek opinion reads like a summary affirmance, although the Court at least provided some reasoning for its decision. Yet sometimes the Court will not even give full briefing or oral hearing to cases on direct appeal, instead summarily affirming them without explanation. In doing so, the Court creates precedent without saying what that precedent is.
As Gill and Benisek show, the three-judge district court is a unique and colorful component of the federal court system. 16 Almost all cases in federal court are adjudicated in the familiar way before one district judge at the trial level, with review thereafter by a three-judge panel of a U.S. Court of Appeals, followed (in a small percentage of those cases) by discretionary, certiorari review in the U.S. Supreme Court. 17 The three-judge district court, which Congress created in 1910 and amended substantially in 1937 and 1976, 18 departs from this pattern in several ways. Three judges-usually two district judges and one appellate judgehear the case at the trial level, and any appeal bypasses the court of appeals and is lodged directly with the Supreme Court, which at least ostensibly must decide the case on the merits. 19. For further detail on the history and operation of the three-judge district court, see infra Part I.
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The mechanism of three-judge district courts with direct appeal to the Supreme Court introduces two distinct questions of precedent. The first question is whether the Supreme Court's decision to summarily affirm (or reverse) a three-judge district court has any precedential effect. Other than binding the parties to the appeal, the precedential weight of these summary dispositions has long been unclear, although most observers believe that they are precedential to at least some extent. 20 The second question asks whether precedent from a circuit court formally binds a three-judge district court from that circuit. A circuit court does not review the decision of a three-judge district court because the appeals process skips over the court of appeals. Should the circuit's precedents bind a three-judge district court that is not subject to the circuit's oversight?
On the first question, this Article advocates for the Court to hear direct appeals in full from three-judge district courts, rather than issue summary rulings without any explanation that may or may not be binding on future lower courts. The Court should fulfill its institutional role in giving full consideration to these appeals, as Congress intended in creating the direct appeal procedure from threejudge district courts. Assuming, however, that the Justices do not want to give full review to a particular case from a three-judge district court, the Court should be able to designate a summary ruling as nonprecedential, at least when the Court refuses to provide its rationale. Why force the Court's hand to set out binding precedent when it would rather let the issue percolate in the lower courts, especially in these highly charged political cases? The current middle ground of issuing a summary decision (typically an affirmance) that is precedential without providing any explanation or reasoning creates unnecessary confusion for lower courts and litigants. Judges on future three-judge district courts, and lawyers who appear before them, must somehow discern which part of the lower court's decision that the Supreme Court summarily affirmed was correct. Was it just the disposition or some of the reasoning as well?
The second question-does circuit precedent bind three-judge district courts?-considers a less noticed anomaly of practice in such courts. The conventional rules for hierarchical precedent are well settled. District courts must follow precedent from the circuit in which they sit but are not obliged to adhere to decisions of other circuits. 21 Of course, all courts must follow precedent from the Supreme Court, but the Court denies most petitions for certiorari, 22 and it is firmly established that such denials are entitled to no precedential weight as they express no "opinion upon the merits of the case." 
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The rules of precedent for three-judge district courts, by contrast, are much less clear. Most three-judge district courts state that they are obliged to follow precedent from the circuit in which they sit, like all other district courts in the circuit, but offer little reasoning for this proposition. 24 But other three-judge district courts do not find themselves so bound, on the theory that the three-judge district court operates outside of the usual hierarchical structure: appeals from those courts go directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the courts of appeals. 25 This difference between theories can be consequential given the common phenomenon of circuit splits. 26 Thus, the rules of precedent are unclear for three-judge district courts from both descending and ascending perspectives. What precedential weight, if any, should all lower federal courts give to the Supreme Court's summary dispositions? And must three-judge district courts follow circuit precedent? Commentators have delved somewhat into the first issue of the precedential weight of Supreme Court summary dispositions, but the Court itself has been mostly equivocal. 27 Scholars have acknowledged, but not explored, the second question on whether three-judge district courts must follow circuit precedent. 28 This Article adds clarity to these debates and suggests their proper resolution. Part I recounts the history and present status of three-judge district courts. It highlights how, after congressional amendments to the three-judge district court statute in the 1970s, direct appeals of these cases have become a small part of the Supreme Court's overall docket but a significant portion of its election law caseload.
The remainder of this Article accepts the reality of the three-judge district court mechanism for certain cases, and instead of questioning their efficacy or soundness, seeks to improve their operation. In doing so, Part II addresses the first puzzle: what precedential weight should all courts give to the Supreme Court's summary dispositions of appeals from the decisions of three-judge district courts? We conclude that these summary decisions are entitled to zero or little precedential value, and therefore, the Justices need not feel obliged to hear these cases in 24 . See 
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THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:413 full if they want the issues to percolate in the lower courts first. They can simply summarily decide the case and bind only the litigants with an explicit statement to that effect. Yet there should be a presumption in favor of the Court providing legal guidance on the issue; that is, most of the time, the Court should set the case for oral argument and provide a full written opinion. This procedure will free the Court from hearing in full all direct appeals of cases from three-judge district courts, reserving its pronouncements for when it affirmatively chooses to resolve the underlying legal issues. Part III addresses the other precedential puzzle: must three-judge district courts apply precedent from the circuit in which they sit? We conclude that three-judge district courts have no such obligation and can give all circuit precedent the weight they deem appropriate. That is, circuit precedent is not formally binding on three-judge district courts, although in many cases it will be highly persuasive.
In making these arguments, we do not mean to suggest that three-judge district courts are the most optimal tribunals for these cases, but only to say that, given their existence, the courts' current practice regarding precedent is untenable.
The three-judge district court procedure is a small part of the federal judiciary's docket, yet it plays a significant role because these courts handle cases involving redistricting and campaign finance, which are two highly charged issues that greatly impact participatory democracy. In fact, the issues that threejudge district courts resolve are often the most contentious and heated of any Supreme Court Term given their importance to the very operation of our democratic structure. Resolving how precedent works for these courts is therefore vital to ensure that the judiciary can properly adjudicate these disputes, ultimately helping our electoral system to function as fairly as possible.
I. HISTORY AND OPERATION OF THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS A. BRIEF HISTORY OF THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS
The three-judge district court has existed, in one form or another, since 1910.
29
Congress enacted the three-judge district court to hear constitutional challenges to state statutes. 30 The procedure was a reaction to the Supreme Court's 1908 decision in Ex parte Young, in which the Court invalidated Progressive Era legislation regulating railroad rates. 31 The theory behind the three-judge district court was that a single federal judge should not have the power to invalidate a state law; "[i]nstead, any such decision would be better discussed and decided by three federal judges, at least one of whom was a court of appeals judge, and perhaps even better received by the interested public. Congress expanded the three-judge district court in 1937 to apply to constitutional challenges to all laws rather than just state statutes. 34 The amended threejudge district court was a minor outgrowth of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, in which Roosevelt sought to reshape the Supreme Court to uphold various aspects of his New Deal legislation. 35 The idea to pack the Court failed, but Congress passed another part of the plan in 1937: the adoption of the three-judge district court for constitutional challenges to federal legislation. 36 The theory was that an injunction against a federal statute was as significant as one against a state statute, such that a single federal judge should not have the sole power to enjoin a federal enactment.
37
The three-judge district court comprised a significant portion of federal courts' work, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, and at times appeals from these courts contributed up to a third of the Supreme Court's docket. 38 Critics complained about both the administrative difficulty of convening three judges for a district court panel and the mandatory Supreme Court review of these courts' decisions. 39 Congress acquiesced in 1976, abolishing the three-judge district court for all but a few substantive areas. 40 Today, federal law requires three-judge district courts only for redistricting cases involving congressional or statewide reapportionments, 41 certain campaign finance challenges, 42 lawsuits under other statutes that Congress has found would benefit from the special three-judge district court procedure, 43 Members of Congress who supported the use of three-judge district courts for these cases believed that having three judges decide the disputes from the outset would better protect important rights, such as the right to vote.
45
Redistricting cases now comprise the bulk of three-judge district court adjudication, although campaign finance cases using this procedure also continue to be influential. 46 [s] ingle judges have in some instances refused to act in the face of convincing evidence" and that three judges would provide a "balance and broad range of views" and therefore a "greater willingness to safeguard the individual's right to vote").
46. Until the Court's decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), which invalidated the preclearance formula of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), three-judge district courts were also convened in declaratory judgment actions under section 5 of the VRA by covered jurisdictions seeking preclearance of any voting changes. See 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (2012) ("Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.").
This provision is still on the books, but without a coverage formula, no jurisdictions are subject to section 5's preclearance requirement, meaning that this use of the three-judge district court is currently obsolete unless a court decides to "bail in" a particular jurisdiction under the rarely-used Section 3 of the VRA after a finding of intentional discrimination. 53 If the case qualifies-because, for example, it is a redistricting dispute involving a congressional or statewide apportionment-then the judge must notify the chief judge of the circuit. 54 The chief judge will then appoint two other judges, one of whom must be a circuit judge, to join the initial district judge on the three-judge district court panel. 55 The original judge may conduct pretrial proceedings and enter preliminary orders but may not render a decision on the merits or grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 56 The three-judge district court panel acts as a trial court, making findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Final judgments of the three-judge district court are appealable directly to the Supreme Court, skipping the intermediate court of appeals stage. 57 The Court may then "note probable jurisdiction," 58 meaning that it will conduct a full hearing, or summarily affirm or reverse, "but either way the Supreme Court must decide the dispute" on the merits. Ct. 450, 455 (2015) . In the interest of full disclosure, we note that we jointly filed an amicus brief in Shapiro supporting the petitioners.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1). 55. Id. The chief judge has full discretion to choose the other two judges-usually one circuit judge and one district judge-to comprise the three-judge district court. Although it is theoretically possible that the chief judge might select judges with ideology in mind, we are not aware of any studies that systematically examine whether this bias occurs in practice. There is some evidence that some "stacking" of three-judge district court panels took place in the Fifth Circuit in the 1950s and early 1960s, purportedly to avoid permitting some conservative district judges from serving on desegregation cases. For further discussion, see Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 110-11 (1996) . For that article, Professor Solimine contacted the chief judges of each of the circuits responsible for selecting the remaining two members of the courts. Of those chief judges or circuit executives who responded, most indicated that chief judges would assign judges from the state in question, and although some indicated that chief judges would take into account some kind of political "balance," there was no evidence in the responses of "stacking" or "packing" the panels. The unique procedures of three-judge district courts raise two fundamental questions about their operation. 61 First, are the Supreme Court's summary rulings on appeals from three-judge district courts binding precedent on lower courts? Second, must these courts follow appellate court decisions in the circuit in which they sit? These procedural questions go to the heart of how three-judge district courts function, giving them outsized importance for the underlying substantive issues-especially on redistricting and campaign finance-that these courts resolve. The remainder of the Article provides some answers, explaining why we should not consider the Supreme Court's summary dispositions as precedential, except in a very limited way, and why prior circuit precedent should not bind three-judge district courts.
II. THE PRECEDENTIAL WEIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS OF APPEALS FROM THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS Under the statute that creates three-judge district courts, the losing party may appeal their decisions directly to the Supreme Court. 62 On its face this procedure is different from the typical process involving a writ of certiorari, through which the Court can simply deny the petition without creating new precedent.
In the normal case involving an appeal from a circuit court of appeals or state supreme court, the losing party below seeks a writ of certiorari, which asks the Supreme Court to review the dispute. The Court has full "judicial discretion" 63 on whether to set the case for briefing and oral argument; Supreme Court practice requires four of the nine Justices to grant the writ and hear a case. 64 The Court will take a case "only for compelling reasons," such as the presence of a circuit 60 61. The purpose of this Article is not to question the propriety of three-judge district courts. We have done so previously in other articles. For instance, one of us has highlighted the benefits and disadvantages of these courts:
Three-judge district courts, with direct review to the Supreme Court, ultimately have some virtues that are important in election law cases: quick resolution, an air of greater accuracy and legitimacy, and the symbolism of increased scrutiny for particularly important cases, to name a few. But they also have less desirable features, such as forcing the Supreme Court to decide an issue earlier than it may wish, a misallocation of tasks in the judicial decisionmaking process, and the possible perpetuation of the view that ideology drives the decisions, Douglas, supra note 16, at 467. Our focus here, instead, is to propose solutions to assist the operation of these courts given that they exist.
62 The procedure for an appeal of a three-judge district court decision, however, is different. Because an appeal from a three-judge district court to the Supreme Court is the only permitted appeal for that litigation, the Court is under some obligation to resolve it on the merits. 67 The Court first determines whether it should consider the case fully, which would include further briefing and an oral argument. 68 To do so, the Court will "note probable jurisdiction," 69 which seems similar to how the Court grants a writ of certiorari. 70 If the Court decides not to give full consideration to the appeal, it will summarily affirm or reverse, almost always with a brief order to that effect but with no explanatory opinion accompanying that order. 71 Unlike a denial of certiorari, a summary disposition is ostensibly "on the merits," especially given that it is the only appeal available in the case. 72 Thus, although the processes for denying certiorari and for summarily affirming the decision of a three-judge district court look similar, the effect of these orders is quite different: the denial of certiorari is not precedential at all, whereas a summary affirmance or reversal has some precedential weight.
Yet it is not clear how much precedential weight, if any, the legal system should give to the Court's supposedly "on the merits" summary dispositions of direct appeals from three-judge district courts. In this Part, we first canvass that confusing body of law. We then expound upon the problems with this approach and provide advice to the Court on how to reform its practice of summary dispositions. We conclude that the Court should set more of these cases for full briefing and oral argument, but also suggest that if the Court wants to issue a summary disposition, it should make clear that its decision (and the decision of the threejudge district court under review) is not precedential and resolves only the precise dispute between the parties in that case.
A. CURRENT JURISPRUDENTIAL STATUS OF SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS FROM THE SUPREME COURT
In a judicial system with multiple levels, a losing party ordinarily may appeal to a higher court as of right, with an "appeal" suggesting full briefing, the potential of oral argument, and an explanatory opinion giving a rationale for a plenary disposition. 73 In the federal system, in most cases a losing party at the district 65. SUP. CT. R. 10. 66. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 335-39. 67. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 300 (by permitting "appeals," Congress suggested "that the losing party may obtain review on the merits by a higher court as of right, not merely a discretionary determination as to whether the higher court will consider the case.").
68 court may appeal, as of right, to the court of appeals. 74 To reach the Supreme Court, the losing party case must file a writ of certiorari, which the Court has the discretion to accept or deny.
Yet a small set of cases-those that arise from three-judge district courtscome to the Supreme Court via direct appeal from the district court. 75 Under the federal statute that created these courts, a direct appeal to the Supreme Court is the only appeal allowed, which is why the Court does not have the discretion to avoid these cases and litigants have a right to this appeal. 76 But the Supreme Court does not always give these cases full review. Instead, the Court often uses summary dispositions (usually affirmances) to resolve these direct appeals. 77 The Court has defended its approach on the ground that only summary treatment is necessary because such cases lack a "substantial federal question" to decide. 78 This practice has made it difficult to discern what precedential weight future courts should afford to such dispositions. At one point, there appears to have been an understanding that lower courts should treat summary dispositions the same as denials of certiorari, that is, with no precedential value.
79
In several decisions from the 1970s, however, the Court departed from that understanding and held that summary affirmances of appeals, unlike certiorari denials, were "on the merits, entitled to precedential weight."
80 But the Court "immediately diluted the effect" of its pronouncement by stating "that [such] summary dispositions will not be accorded the full weight of decisions in which the issues were fully explored."
81
In short, it "seems fair to say that the whole Court agrees that summary dispositions are entitled to some weight, but to less than fully articulated decisions. . . .
[T]he Justices feel less intellectual commitment to such decisions, even though they are a disposition on the merits." 82 In other words, the Court has tried to find a middle ground, giving some precedential value to summary dispositions, which 
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PRECEDENT, THREE-JUDGE DIST. CTS., & THE L. OF DEMOCRACYare supposedly on the merits, but failing to accord them the same weight as other decisions that have a full opinion. Most of the Court's decisions discussing the precedential weight of summary dispositions deal with how the Court itself should treat its own summary rulings. But the Court has made clear that lower courts should also consider such summary dispositions as precedential in the same way. 83 In Hicks v. Miranda, for instance, the Court chastised a lower court for "disregard[ing]" a summary affirmance by noting,
We were not obligated to grant the case plenary consideration, and we did not; but we were required to deal with its merits. We did so by concluding that the appeal should be dismissed because the constitutional challenge to the California statute was not a substantial one. The three-judge court was not free to disregard this pronouncement. As MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN once observed, " [v] otes to affirm summarily, and to dismiss for want of a substantial federal question, it hardly needs comment, are votes on the merits of a case . . . ."
84
Not surprisingly, given that the Court has been vague on the level of precedential weight these decisions should engender, lower courts have also expressed confusion as to what aspects of a summary decision they must follow. 85 Without an explanatory opinion, it is unclear whether all or some of the Justices agreed on a rationale for affirming the lower court, or even what rationale sustained the decision. 86 The Court has unhelpfully stated that "[a] summary disposition affirms only the judgment of the court below, and no more may be read into our action than was essential to sustain that judgment." 87 This apparently means that the Court is not necessarily adopting the reasoning of the lower court when summarily affirming.
88
But how can a lower court determine what was "essential" for the Supreme Court to sustain the judgment? The Supreme Court has stated that the lower court should assess the affirmance "in light of all of the facts" and compare those facts to the facts presented in the separate, new case to determine if the facts of the two cases are "very different." 89 This instruction seemingly means that the subsequent lower court should determine if the constitutional issues in the two cases are the same, 90 though the scope of the required overlap between the two cases is elusive. To make this comparison, moreover, "lower court judges must have before them 83 most if not all of the appeal papers in the earlier proceedings, and must not rely too much on the rationale expressed in the lower court opinions in the earlier cases." 91 Many judges and lawyers would "find this approach to prior Supreme Court summary actions both difficult and hazardous to follow." 92 As Justice Sotomayor wrote in dissent in a recent case involving whether the Court had jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a three-judge district court, " [s] imple is thus the name of the game when it comes to jurisdictional rules."
93 Yet the current approach of using summary dispositions without explanation is anything but simple.
Some recent decisions illustrate well the implications of the Supreme Court's summary disposition jurisprudence. In Cox v. Larios, the Court summarily affirmed an appeal from a three-judge district court in a reapportionment case involving the redrawing of state legislative lines. 94 Prior Court decisions had left unclear how much and under what circumstances legislatures could deviate from strict mathematical one-person, one-vote equality in drawing state legislative districts. Although not models of consistency, those prior cases arguably established that the one-person, one-vote principle allowed population deviances of up to ten percent, meaning that a deviation of less than ten percent was permissible. 95 Yet the lower court in Cox struck down a state map in which the deviances were slightly less than ten percent, 96 finding that such deviances existed for illegitimate, strictly partisan grounds rather than for nonpolitical reasons, such as tracking the lines of existing political subdivisions. 97 The Court summarily affirmed without a written explanation. 98 The decision left the state of the law on ten percent safe harbors unclear.
99 Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion and Justice Scalia authored a dissent, exacerbating the lack of clarity from the Court's decision given that the majority did not provide a rationale for its summary affirmance. 101 It appeared from Harris that by summarily affirming the three-judge district court's decision in Cox, the Court had essentially adopted that court's rationalealthough the Court did not make this explicit or clear when it summarily affirmed the decision in Cox. The Court could have dispelled much of this confusion if it had given the appeal plenary treatment in the first instance, explained specifically what aspect of the lower court it was affirming, or directly stated that its summary affirmance was not precedential at all.
Another example of the implications that arise from the Court's summary disposition jurisprudence comes from the campaign finance world, where the Court is statutorily obliged to review three-judge district court decisions that consider constitutional challenges to various provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2003 (BCRA). 102 The Court has given full consideration to a stream of challenges that initially went before three-judge district courts in the District of Columbia, complete with full explanatory opinions.
103 But in at least two significant cases, the lower courts rejected the challenges and the Supreme Court summarily affirmed those decisions without explanation. One such case concerned the BCRA provision limiting federal election spending by foreigners, 104 while the other concerned the BCRA provision limiting "soft-money" campaign contributions to state and local political parties. 105 In both cases, some observers argued that the summary dispositions were surprising because prior decisions striking down other BCRA provisions had arguably cast doubt on the constitutional validity of these parts of the law. 106 In response to Bluman, some observers felt that the broad rationale of Citizens United cast serious doubt on the provision excluding foreign contributions. Yet the status of these two summary affirmances as precedential for future cases remains unclear. For such highprofile legal challenges involving important political issues, the Court should provide more than just a perfunctory summary affirmance. The Supreme Court's current summary disposition practice has inspired some forceful opposition-with which we ultimately agree. On the Court itself, for example, Justice William Brennan stated that if summary affirmances have any precedential weight, even if less than a full opinion, then "at a minimum we have the duty to provide some explanation of the issues presented in the case and the reasons and authorities supporting our summary dispositions."
107 Although Justice Brennan expressed his belief that this obligation existed for "every case," he also made clear that the Court had a particular responsibility for cases "presenting novel issues or where there is disagreement among us as to the grounds of the disposition."
108
The leading treatise on Supreme Court practice echoes Justice Brennan's position on this issue. 109 The treatise's authors conclude that lower courts and the bar would benefit from further explanation, arguing that it would help, for example, if "instead of merely saying 'affirmed,' the Court briefly stated the ground for its ruling, or cited a case that would indicate the ground. Although this would make summary disposition slightly less summary, the additional understanding it would produce would reduce the amount of future litigation."
110 This benefit, they continue, "would likely outweigh the additional burden that would be imposed," especially given the relatively few direct appeals that now go to the Court.
111
Sound institutional reasons support abolishing, or at least limiting, the use of precedential summary affirmances for direct appeals from three-judge district courts. Summary dispositions, which may or may not have precedential weight, have caused considerable confusion not only for the Court itself, but also for lower court judges and attorneys practicing before three-judge district courts. How should future litigants decipher the cryptic one-line decisions that are 107 Requiring the Supreme Court to provide some rationale for its decision is not likely to lead to much further delay because the Court decides all of its cases within a single Term running from October to June. Moreover, by skipping the court of appeals stage, the litigation is already streamlined, which was one of the goals behind Congress's creation of three-judge district courts. See Douglas, supra note 16, at 460-62 (showing how long it takes the Supreme Court to resolve appeals from three-judge district courts, ranging from about four months to a little over a year and a half).
111. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 311. Relatedly, one commentator has expressed concerns with the Court's frequent use of summary orders to dispose of requests for stays of lower court decisions concerning the death penalty, pending elections, and other cases needing rapid treatment. . But in many of those cases, there is a need for swift rulings and virtually no time to prepare even a short explanatory opinion (though the Court could release one later). In contrast, there is rarely such a need for swiftness to decide direct appeals in three-judge district court cases.
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PRECEDENT, THREE-JUDGE DIST. CTS., & THE L. OF DEMOCRACYcurrently, and confusingly, described as being "on the merits?" Are they fully precedential, entitled to only some weight, or not precedential at all? Nevertheless, there are several possible reasons why the Court might choose to maintain the status quo of summarily affirming those cases in which it does not wish to provide more guidance. First, given the statutory changes in the 1970s and 1980s that limited the kinds of cases that warrant a three-judge district court, there are relatively few cases that arrive at the Supreme Court on direct appeal. 112 Thus, even if one concedes that the Court's practice leads to jurisprudential confusion, its approach concerns only a small number of cases and certainly far fewer than the large number of such cases and appeals in the 1960s and 1970s. These cases, however, go to the heart of representative democracy, so they are arguably different from other legal disputes, which is why Congress gave them a special procedure in the first place. Cases about democratic processes are sufficiently consequential that we should be concerned about the confusion that surrounds them.
Second, one might defend the summary affirmance practice as a nod to the legal acumen of three lower federal court judges, meaning that another multimember court need not spend as much time reviewing the lower court's decision. 113 Yet this same rationale might also apply to the Court's denials of certiorari from three-judge appellate panels on the circuit courts, but those orders are not precedential.
Third, as a practical matter, summary dispositions of direct appeals, like denials of certiorari, may permit the Court to act strategically and dodge the need to confront directly a particularly controversial or politically charged issue. 114 But treating a summary disposition as potentially precedential compromises that strategy.
Fourth, the Court's frequent invocation of the "narrow" construction it has given to the Three-Judge Court Act might also support its approach to summary dispositions of these appeals. 115 Without apology, the Court has stated that a narrow construction is necessary to "minimize[e] the mandatory docket of this Court 114. See generally Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1, 17-18 (2016) (discussing denials of certiorari and other mechanisms where the Court, without explanation, can avoid confronting difficult or controversial issues). As one of us has suggested, the Court seems to suffer from "BCRA-fatigue" and may not wish to issue full opinions on the seemingly endless stream of constitutional challenges to various provisions of the BCRA. Solimine, supra note 99, at 779. See also Gonzalez v. Automatic Emps. Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 99 n.17 (1974) (stating that many three-judge district court cases that are summarily affirmed "would benefit from the normal appellate review").
115. Solimine, supra note 33, at 134-35, 140 (discussing the overtly narrow construction the Court gave to the statute).
430
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:413 in the interests of sound judicial administration." 116 The use of summary affirmances to decide direct appeals is consistent with that limited construction, insofar as it streamlines the Court's involvement in these cases. But again, that cursory review is at odds with the special procedures Congress created for these kinds of cases, particularly those that affect elections.
Finally, whether intended or not, perhaps the Court's current practice of using summary affirmances has the virtue of signaling to lower courts that they may adopt reasonable but narrower readings of Court precedent, especially if that precedent comes from a summary disposition and not a full opinion. Such narrowing may have social benefits when the Court's precedents in question are obsolete or have had harmful consequences.
117 This narrowing allows a middle ground between lower courts dogmatically applying Court precedent in all circumstances and the Court having to decide whether to overrule one of its own cases. 118 The Court could summarily affirm, obliquely upholding a three-judge district court decision, without explicitly adopting its narrowing construction. Again, however, that narrowing from below comes at a cost: opacity in an area such as election law, where clarity is a virtue.
C. REFORMING THE COURT'S SUMMARY DISPOSITION PRACTICE
We agree with the reformers: the Court should eliminate its middle-ground, confusing position of issuing summary decisions while claiming that they have some (but perhaps not full) precedential weight. Instead, the Court should take one of two clearer paths: (1) either treat a direct appeal of a decision from a threejudge district court like a grant of certiorari and set the case for full briefing and 118. Professor Re does not discuss at any length how the institution of the three-judge district court, coupled with direct appeals, fits in the "narrowing from below" model. See id. Nonetheless, it is significant that he mentions, as a "classic example" of when "a lower court might predict that the higher court will overrule or otherwise set aside its own case law," the case of Both Barnette and Younger involve "overruling," rather than merely "narrowing" from below, but both arguably illustrate how three-judge district courts might regard themselves as being able to take a more flexible view of precedent as compared to a single district judge.
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PRECEDENT, THREE-JUDGE DIST. CTS., & THE L. OF DEMOCRACYoral argument, or (2) summarily decide the case while stating explicitly that the order is not precedential to any degree besides binding the parties in that litigation. There are strong arguments for a presumption that the Court should give plenary consideration to all direct appeals of three-judge district court decisions, absent exceptional circumstances. 119 This process would entail full briefing and consideration, with some explanatory decision to follow. The result of this full briefing and consideration could be either a traditional full opinion or a shorter decision, much like Justice Brennan contemplated. 120 A short decision could explain the main basis of the Court's decision or provide a case cite or two to signal what precedent dictated the outcome, thereby providing guidance for future three-judge district courts. The Court does not necessarily need to hold oral argument and two rounds of briefing in all such cases.
In fact, the Court used this approach, to some extent, in Benisek v. Lamone, the 2018 partisan gerrymandering case from Maryland, when it issued a five-page per curiam decision explaining the procedural basis for affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction. 121 Instead of just summarily affirming the lower court's holding, the Court provided a brief rationale for its decision, which will help three-judge district courts in the future when they face a request for a preliminary injunction to invalidate a map for the next election. Thus, one way to solve the current confusion regarding the precedential value of the Court's summary dispositions is to adopt a presumption against summary dispositions.
122
Alternatively, given the potential administrative concerns, the Court itself may not look kindly upon a directive to consider these cases in full, leading to our second suggestion: if the Court deems full hearings for all cases on appeal from three-judge district courts administratively impracticable, the Court should explicitly state that a summary disposition is not precedential and merely resolves the dispute before it. This practice would eliminate any concern that future courts or different litigants must rely upon the summary disposition, and it would Chief Justice Roberts, in particular, may look more favorably upon our prescription that summary decisions should have no precedential weight and would likely recoil at a suggestion that the Court hear more of these cases in full. In a recent oral argument, the Chief Justice indirectly expressed concern about the prospect of an increased number of direct appeals from three-judge district courts. 123 He suggested that it is "a serious problem because there are a lot" of appeals in reapportionment cases from three-judge district courts. 124 Ordinarily, he noted, the Court does not review all such cases but instead might allow an issue to "percolate" in the lower courts, but with an appeal from a three-judge district court, the Court is bound "to decide it on the merits." 125 In light of these remarks, Chief Justice Roberts presumably would oppose our proposal for the Court to devote greater attention to virtually all such appeals.
Although Chief Justice Roberts's concerns about spending more time on these cases are not trivial, they are ultimately unconvincing. His unease with a potential avalanche of direct appeals might have carried more weight in the 1960s and 1970s, when the Court was deciding twenty to thirty or even more direct appeals each Term in the midst of a workload of around 150 cases in total.
126 Similar arguments about the Court's caseload convinced Congress to curtail the jurisdiction of three-judge district courts in 1976. 127 This argument is much less convincing in the current era of a shrunken docket, where the Court hears around eighty cases each Term, with only a handful coming on direct mandatory appeal from three-judge district courts. 128 To be sure, there are a significant-but not overwhelming-number of reapportionment cases brought every time states redraw their federal and state legislative districts after a new census in the early part of a 123. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015) (No. 14-990). Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court in Shapiro, which concerned the standard a district judge, to whom the case is initially assigned, should apply when determining whether to convene a three-judge district court under the relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § § 2284(a), (b). 136 S. Ct. at 453. The Court's opinion makes no reference to the policy concerns the Chief Justice raised during the oral argument, and the Chief Justice did not submit a separate opinion. Indeed, the opinion, somewhat counter to the Chief Justice's concerns, states: "Rare today, three-judge district courts were more common in the decades before 1976." Id. (emphasis added).
124. But not all of those cases result in a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, and of those that do, they often arrive at the Court spread out over several years. For example, in the 2016 Term the Supreme Court decided two cases that involved redistricting that occurred in 2011, after the 2010 census. 130 The 2017 Term included the two partisan gerrymandering cases, Gill and Benisek, and a racial gerrymandering case, Abbott v. Perez. 131 Plainly, the workload from direct appeals is not overly burdensome.
In addition, even while lamenting the mandatory nature of these direct appeals, the Justices themselves have noted that the caseload is not that large. In Abbott, the racial gerrymandering case from 2018, the Court held that it had jurisdiction over an appeal of an interlocutory injunction, noting that "appeals from such orders have not overwhelmed our docket."
132 Justice Alito wrote those words for the five-justice majority, which included Chief Justice Roberts, suggesting that the Chief has less concern about an increased caseload than he initially intimated. As the Court wrote, "[w]e appreciate our obligation to heed the limits of our jurisdiction, and we reiterate that § 1253 [the statute providing for direct appeals from three-judge district courts] must be strictly construed. But it also must be sensibly construed . . . ."
133 A sensible construction requires the Court either to consider these appeals fully or, if it is unwilling to do so, to refrain from issuing a one-line opinion without explanation that lower courts must follow as binding precedent.
Most importantly, Congress has made the policy decision to leave intact the three-judge district court, with its unusual direct appeal, for reapportionment and a small number of other cases. 134 Keeping three-judge district courts for specific issues suggests that Congress wants the Court to continue hearing these disputes on direct appeal. Perhaps it was unwise to create such courts in the first instance, and maybe the conventional three-tiered path for all cases in federal court should cover reapportionment and other disputes now adjudicated before three-judge district courts. 135 But it seems unlikely that, in today's political environment, Congress has the appetite to reform this aspect of federal court jurisdiction. Because of the inherent confusion in the Court's current practice, if it is unwilling to set these cases for full briefing and argument, with an explanatory opinion to follow, then as a next-best solution it should explicitly state in its summary opinions that the decisions carry no precedential weight and bind only the parties to the specific litigation. This practice would at least eliminate one confusing aspect of the current approach. A qualifying statement from the Court instructing lawyers and lower courts that they should not treat a summary affirmance as binding precedent would be similar to an "unpublished" opinion that a lower court may issue in a case that the court finds less worthy of publication. Although parties may cite unpublished opinions as persuasive authority, a district court need not treat a circuit court's unpublished decision as binding precedent.
137 Allowing courts to designate certain opinions as "unpublished" and therefore not precedential arguably eases the court's workload, allowing it to issue a perhaps less-thanpolished opinion that resolves the dispute without worrying about the future precedential effects of that specific case. 138 Whether that feature of appellate court practice actually helps judicial administration is perhaps debatable, 139 but 136. Given that, as we have been emphasizing, the relevant statutory language explicitly refers to an "appeal to the Supreme Court," 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012), it might be argued that our second suggestion, permitting the Court to summarily rule but not to accord such ruling precedential weight, is in tension with the statutory language. The argument would be that such a diluted ruling is not what Congress contemplated when it referred to an "appeal" available for three-judge district courts. We disagree because there are examples of explained decisions on appeals that do not have precedential weight. Consider the common practice of not giving such weight to decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals that are not officially published. See infra note 138 and accompanying text. We concede that the analogy to officially unpublished decisions of the Courts of Appeals is not perfect. Any decision of the Supreme Court with even minimal explanation is likely to be considered of some significance. Nonetheless, the long-standing experience of the Courts of Appeals on this issue is worthy of the Supreme Court's consideration.
137. See, e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4 ("Unpublished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996, are not precedent, except under the doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case (or similarly to show double jeopardy, notice, sanctionable conduct, entitlement to attorney's fees, or the like 2019] PRECEDENT, THREE-JUDGE DIST. CTS., & THE L. OF DEMOCRACYthe efficacy of using unpublished opinions is irrelevant to our current inquiry. Instead, the important takeaway is that the federal judiciary already has a mechanism to resolve a case without creating binding precedent, so the Court is well within the bounds of established judicial practice to adopt this method for the few cases it receives on direct appeal. Sound jurisprudential and institutional reasons support a presumption that the Court should hear all of these cases and issue an explanatory opinion in each one. But we are also realistic in acknowledging that the Court may not adopt this solution. In the alternative, the Court could cure at least one aspect of the current confusion by stating explicitly that summary dispositions of appeals from threejudge district courts are not actually precedential. That practice would represent a significant improvement over the current status quo.
D. REFORMING THE COURT'S NARROW CANON OF CONSTRUCTION OF THE THREE-JUDGE COURT ACT
A corollary of our proposal should lead the Court to jettison its canon of strict and narrow construction of the three-judge district court statute. Currently, the Court applies a strict construction to almost all jurisdictional statutes, which often leads the Court to overtly or inferentially limit the number of cases that flow to the Court and the lower federal courts. 141 Similarly, when construing the statute dealing with the three-judge district court, the Court has frequently engaged in an overt strict construction to reduce the number of times a three-judge district court needs to be convened and to limit direct appeals to the Court. 142 Even when conferring jurisdiction over an appeal from an interlocutory injunction-where the Court read the three-judge district court's decision broadly as issuing an injunction even though the lower court did not use that word-the Court still said that it must "strictly construe" the statute. 143 The Court might invoke this same narrow construction to justify the use of summary dispositions that may or may not be precedential.
144
But the Supreme Court has recently eschewed application of this narrow canon for jurisdictional statutes. 145 In Shapiro v. McManus, the Court, in a unanimous (arguing that the system of unpublished opinions creates uncertainty for "consumers" of opinions and increases the amount of federal litigation). 140. We acknowledge that under our proposal, summary affirmances without any precedential value may increase uncertainty in the lower courts regarding the proper disposition of reapportionment litigation, and may create more litigation and appeals to the Supreme Court. All of this is possible, but there is already substantial uncertainty under the present regime regarding how lower courts, and the Court itself, should interpret summary affirmances. On balance, we think it would clarify matters to strip those affirmances of any precedential value. It would also incentivize the Court to issue explanatory opinions to have a precedential effect.
141. For an overview of this canon, see generally Aaron-Andrew P. opinion by Justice Scalia (a noted textualist), studiously applied strict textual analysis to conclude that the jurisdictional statutes require the convening of the three-judge district court when a constitutional challenge to a reapportionment presents a substantial federal question. 146 There was no mention of the strict interpretation canon. Similarly, in Abbott, the Court recently conferred jurisdiction over an appeal from what it deemed to be an interlocutory injunction, even though the lower court explicitly disavowed that its opinion was an injunction. 147 The Court reiterated that it must construe the statute strictly while also explaining that it should apply a "sensible" construction to hear the case.
148 Justice Sotomayor, in dissent, chastised the majority for abandoning a strict interpretation, which she said would result in more direct appeals.
149
Professor Aaron-Andrew Bruhl has argued persuasively that the legal system should evaluate the narrow construction canon (like other statutory construction canons) based on, among other things, its historical pedigree, as well as its relationship to constitutional values and congressional preferences. 150 Applying these factors, the strict construction canon does not fare well in the present context. Strict construction certainly has historical pedigree; the Supreme Court overtly invoked a narrow construction of the three-judge district court statute as far back as 1928. 151 But under the other factors, the narrow construction canon has no place when considering the three-judge district court statute. These courts hear contentious constitutional issues that underlie the foundation of our democracy, which Congress determined will benefit from a special tribunal. A strict construction of the jurisdictional statutes to limit the Court's docket for these cases runs counter to this legislative judgment. Thus, the Court's shrunken docket overall, congressional amendments in the 1970s, and the institutional characteristics of the modern three-judge district court-when considered together-demonstrate that the Court should not interpret the statute to limit its own jurisdiction over direct appeals.
Minimizing summary dispositions in either direction-by hearing all of these cases or stating explicitly that they are not precedential-will not unduly burden the Court. The continued use of such dispositions is particularly indefensible in an era of a shrunken docket, where the Court hears around eighty cases a year and only a few of those involve direct appeals from three-judge district courts. 152 2009) (noting that the Court should "make the most of the cases it does hear by issuing broad (maximal) decisions that guide the lower courts in the many cases that it lacks the capacity to review").
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PRECEDENT, THREE-JUDGE DIST. CTS., & THE L. OF DEMOCRACYpresumption in favor of explanatory opinions, even relatively short ones, should appropriately discipline the Court to give more serious attention to the statutes that vest mandatory appeals with the Court, instead of treating them the same as petitions for certiorari but with differing precedential effects for a refusal to hear a case. 153 The Court should limit its one-line orders to those cases, like denials of certiorari, where it truly intends to leave the lower court's opinion intact without any explanation or precedent.
III. PRECEDENT THAT BINDS THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS
A related question of precedent vexes three-judge district courts themselves: to what extent must they follow prior cases of the circuit court in which they sit? On the one hand, these courts are formally "district" courts, suggesting that they should follow the caselaw of the circuit, like all single district judges in that circuit. This appears to be the majority view among these courts.
154
On the other hand, an appeal from a decision of these courts goes directly to the Supreme Court, skipping the circuit court of appeals altogether. 155 If a court is bound only by the decisions of the courts that review them, then the only precedent that should bind three-judge district courts are decisions of the Supreme Court. Even though three-judge district courts are called "district" courts, they are not inferior to the circuit courts in all circumstances. Three-judge district courts are specialized creatures that are not formally "below" the circuit courts but instead generally operate outside of them. Moreover, Congress created these courts to have greater independence to promote their legitimacy. Under this view, circuit precedent should not bind them. Three-judge district courts have struggled with whether they must follow circuit precedent. Some judges have determined that, because they are technically sitting on "district" courts, and because district courts are below the circuit courts of appeal, then circuit precedent must bind them. But other judges sitting on three-judge district courts take the opposite view: circuit precedent is persuasive, but not binding, given that circuit courts cannot review their decisions, as an appeal skips the court of appeals and goes directly to the Supreme Court. Few judges, however, have considered explicitly the rationale behind either approach.
153. Several commentators have characterized the Court's conflation of denials of certiorari with summary affirmances of mandatory appeals as "lawless" because it is arguably inconsistent with the direct appeal statutes and is done, it appears, mainly for the Court's own convenience. The analysis from a three-judge district court that reviewed Ohio's post-2000 redistricting plan exemplifies this problem. In Parker v. Ohio, the plaintiffs alleged that the redistricting plan for the state legislature diluted the votes of African-Americans, in violation of the Voting Rights Act. 157 Because the claim challenged a statewide redistricting, it went before a three-judge district court. The plaintiffs sought the creation of "influence districts" as a remedy to give African-Americans greater voting power. 158 In an influence district, even though minorities "cannot form a majority, . . . they are sufficiently large and cohesive to effectively influence elections, getting their candidate of choice elected." 159 In a prior case, Cousin v. Sundquist, the Sixth Circuit held that the Voting Rights Act did not support a claim for influence districts. 160 Cousin did not go before a threejudge district court because the claim in that case was about the method of electing judges in a county in Tennessee 161 -not a congressional or statewide legislative redistricting claim that would fall under the Three-Judge Court Act. Yet the substantive nature of the issue was the same: may plaintiffs secure the creation of influence districts under the Voting Rights Act?
The three-judge district court in Parker determined that it was required to follow the Sixth Circuit's holding in Cousin that the VRA did not support this argument: "While plaintiffs are correct that the . . . Supreme Court [has] not yet ruled on influence districts, we are bound by precedent in this circuit." 162 In other words, the Parker court found that, because of Cousin, "influence claims are not cognizable in our circuit." 163 Yet the court provided no reasoning for its conclusion that it must follow Sixth Circuit precedent. The majority opinion simply stated, without explanation, "we are bound by precedent in this circuit," 164 and the concurrence said, again without any animating logic, "a majority of three-judge district courts and circuit courts of appeals hold that circuit court precedent is binding on a three-judge district court." 165 It is unclear how the court would have ruled on the issue had it exercised its own, independent judgment, though one concurring judge said he would have rejected the claim even without the precedent he found binding 166 
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Most three-judge district courts have agreed with the Parker court, finding that circuit precedent binds them. 168 One three-judge district court provided some logic for this rule: "The addition by Congress in the three-judge court acts of a second district judge and a Circuit Judge together with direct appeal to the Supreme Court was not a grant of authority with elevated precedential stature but a withdrawal of power from a single judge." 169 According to this view, a threejudge district court is simply that-a district court-that sits within the circuit. The court itself is called the "District Court of" the particular state in the circuit. 170 It is not constituted as a geography-free federal tribunal. Failing to adhere to circuit precedent could create a practical problem: the creation of "intra-circuit conflict with no meaningful mechanism for its resolution within the Circuit," meaning that only the Supreme Court could resolve that conflict. 171 That is, if a three-judge district court rules contrary to the prior decisions of a previous three-judge district court or the circuit itself, then the circuit courteither through a normal appellate panel or en banc review-has no mechanism to reconcile the conflicting rules. This intra-circuit conflict could lead to confusion and additional litigation, forcing the Supreme Court to step in and resolve the discrepancy.
Yet the alternative view, that circuit precedent does not formally bind the three-judge district court, is quite persuasive, at least from the perspective of traditional judicial decisionmaking. As Judge Gwin, who wrote separately in Parker, explained:
The doctrine of stare decisis in practice, commands that lower courts follow the precedent of courts who review their decisions. If our decision is reviewable only by the Supreme Court, logic suggests that we are not bound by circuit authority. While such authority may persuade, only Supreme Court A practical analysis would emphasize how the circuit is intertwined with the creation and life of the three-judge district court. One could imagine convening the court and selecting the three judges in other ways, such as by lottery, or by the Chief Justice of the United States. But Congress designated the head of the circuit to do it, and the statute seems to contemplate, though does not explicitly require, that all of the appointed judges be from that circuit. Likewise, one could imagine a geography-free court (such as the U.S. Tax Court), but Congress declined to pursue this option as well. All proceedings of the court take place, literally, in one circuit.
171 Similarly, a three-judge district court in Washington State explicitly stated, "[i]n this special three-judge court case we are not bound by any judicial decisions other than those of the United States Supreme Court." 173 Other courts have at least considered it an open question as to whether they must follow circuit precedent or whether only Supreme Court caselaw can bind them. 174 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF DETERMINING WHICH PRECEDENT APPLIES
At the outset, the question of whether three-judge district courts must follow circuit precedent as binding law might seem trivial. Whether circuit law is binding precedent or merely persuasive may not make a difference in most cases, as the three-judge district court is likely to follow a well-reasoned circuit court decision regardless of whether it is formally binding precedent or not. In the grand scheme of things, what is the big deal?
There are three primary reasons for three-judge district courts to consider carefully whether they must follow circuit precedent: (1) the formal aspects of proper judicial decisionmaking, (2) adherence to congressional intent in achieving greater independence and legitimacy, and (3) the desire to reach correct outcomes, especially in politically charged cases.
First, it is improper as a matter of judicial hierarchy for a case to bind a subsequent court when the court issuing that purported precedent cannot review the subsequent court's decisions. "Binding precedent" has a specific meaning: a "lower" court must follow the decisions of a "higher" court in the judicial hierarchy. 175 This is a consideration grounded in formalism, or the notion that judicial decisionmaking must adhere to formal legal rules. 176 A circuit court cannot review the decision of a three-judge district court, so a three-judge district court need not, as a matter of formal judicial decisionmaking, adhere to circuit precedent. Of course, a three-judge district court can follow circuit precedent as persuasive if it wants; the proper understanding of a judge's role in a hierarchical system, however, does not require it to do so. 177 Three-judge district courts themselves express confusion over whether they must follow circuit precedent as a matter of proper judicial decisionmaking. As a three-judge district court in Georgia recently explained, [S] ome say the traditional rationale for stare decisis-following the precedent of courts that review the lower court's decisions-does not make sense for three-judge district courts like ours. . . . Nevertheless, this panel elects to follow Eleventh Circuit precedent.
At the same time, we realize that what we decide here cannot be reviewed by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc, even if the en banc court were to disagree with us. And our lack of guidance extends beyond the en banc court, because the Supreme Court routinely issues summary affirmances of threejudge district courts in voting cases. Those summary opinions often tell us nothing more than that a judgment was correct "but not necessarily the reasoning." Thus, in this area of voting rights, we are left to fill in gaps where we have little or incomplete guidance from the courts that may ultimately resolve these issues.
178
One of the judges, in a concurring opinion, lamented that "[i]t seems the rationale for following circuit precedent is because courts have found that some law is better than no law."
179 Noting that the question was "unclear," the judge "reluctantly" agreed to follow circuit precedent because doing so in that case "promotes, albeit to an uncertain degree, uniformity of the law at least within a circuit."
180
As this recent Georgia case demonstrates, some judges on three-judge district courts find the notion odd, if not improper, that they must follow circuit law when the circuit court cannot overrule them. A proper application of judicial hierarchy in this instance would resolve the confusion.
Second, Congress presumed that having three judges at the outset of a case would better protect important rights such as the right to vote. 181 Independence in these important political cases is thus a significant virtue underlying the very existence of three-judge district courts. Congress created the three-judge district court 177. As discussed below, as a matter of court rule, circuit court precedent can bind a subsequent circuit court panel, even though one panel cannot review the decisions of another panel. Yet the same court, sitting en banc, can reverse a panel decision. More poignantly, the prior-panel rule rests on strong institutional reasons, such as the need for uniformity within a circuit, that are less relevant in the threejudge district court context. specifically to allow multiple minds to resolve highly charged issues at the case's inception. 182 Although it is not clear why Congress kept the three-judge district court for redistricting and campaign finance cases while abolishing it in most other instances in 1976, it seems that an animating rationale was that three judges at the outset are superior for cases involving the political process. 183 Having three judges can lead to greater deliberation and reduce the likelihood that pure partisanship will drive the decisions at the trial court level.
184
A rule that three-judge district courts must follow circuit precedent, however, may harm the unique status, and thus legitimacy, that Congress sought in their creation. Three-judge district courts would be without the authority to determine independently whether the circuit rule in a similar case is wise or even correct; a mandatory rule would obligate them to follow the circuit precedent blindlyeven precedent that they find simply wrong but that the en banc court has not yet overturned. In this way, a rule that three-judge district courts must invariably follow circuit precedent would unnecessarily tie the hands of the three-judge district court. Congress, in creating this unique species of the judiciary to resolve certain 182. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 757 (1982) ("Assuming that all panel members take seriously their responsibility for independent exercise of judgment, the give and take of discussion may produce a result better than any single mind could reach.").
183. See Solimine, supra note 33, at 142 ("The legislative record is unclear regarding the motivation for the amendment [abolishing three-judge district courts in general but retaining them for redistricting cases], but such luminaries as Judges Henry Friendly and J. Skelly Wright enthusiastically endorsed it in their testimony. They pointed out the various burdens associated with convening such courts and argued that the purported need for the court had come and gone. On the other hand, they suggested that it was appropriate to convene such courts for redistricting cases in order to facilitate issues of 'public importance' and, in their view, the 'public acceptance' of decisions. Moreover, they stated that the evidence in such cases was likely to be heavily statistical in nature, and that no additional taking of other evidence would typically be necessary." ( that judges in redistricting cases can be described as constrained partisans). Our point is that it is reasonable to infer that Congress retained the three-judge district court for reapportionment cases, at least in part, on the presumption that ideological and political considerations by judges in these settings would be ameliorated, or at least balanced, with multiple members.
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PRECEDENT, THREE-JUDGE DIST. CTS., & THE L. OF DEMOCRACYissues, believed that it would be better for three judicial minds to grapple with potentially difficult and controversial topics at the trial court level. 185 That special process within the federal court system provides the legitimacy that undergirds these courts' creation. Although all lower courts must follow precedent, unnecessarily binding three-judge district courts would take away an aspect of their independence.
Finally, forcing a three-judge district court to follow circuit precedent might lead this court to come to a contrary conclusion than if it had reviewed the matter anew, producing results that could undermine the democratic process. One aspect of the independence and legitimacy that three-judge district courts enjoy is the increased likelihood that their collective wisdom might help them reach the "correct" decision and that a single judge's ideology will not rule the day. The hope for greater accuracy is a virtue of three-judge district courts.
186 If the three-judge district court finds that circuit precedent is wrong, however, there is no way for the court to avoid that decision under a rule directing it to follow circuit precedent as binding. Of course, three-judge panels of a circuit court of appeals also have multiple members, possibly tempering ideological and incorrect decisions, so one might think that it is inconsequential to have those decisions bind subsequent three-judge district courts. But Congress designated certain cases involving the political process for three judges at the trial level to give these courts greater legitimacy; tying their hands might take away from that goal.
Under a regime that requires three-judge district courts to follow circuit precedent they find misguided, the judges would have to highlight the problem and hope that the Supreme Court will correct the error on direct review. Yet the Court often summarily affirms these courts' decisions. 187 That fact means that the Court could affirm the three-judge district court's decision, albeit on a different ground, without passing upon the circuit precedent on which the three-judge district court relied. This course of events could, in turn, cause the Court itself to perpetuate a circuit split on an issue. Suppose that two different circuits have ruled differently on a legal issue involving a local redistricting, but the Supreme Court has not yet resolved the conflict. Three-judge district courts encountering the same legal issue in a statewide redistricting case in those circuits would have to follow each circuit's law. That is, the three-judge district courts would be required to perpetuate that circuit split. And because these cases receive direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court could summarily affirm both cases without explanation, with the perverse effect of the Court inadvertently sustaining a circuit split. It would be unclear whether the Court, in summarily affirming the cases, was also affirming the three-judge district court's reliance on circuit precedent. Allowing a three-judge district court to consider the issue independently could mitigate this 185 problem by permitting three-judge district courts to resolve cases as they see fit, avoiding the potential of an incorrect decision (as deemed later by the Supreme Court) simply because the lower court could not question circuit precedent. In fact, the Supreme Court has inadvertently perpetuated an implicit circuit split on whether circuit precedent is binding by affirming three-judge district courts that have both followed and not followed circuit precedent. Does this mean that circuit precedent both binds and does not bind a three-judge district court? For example, the Court has summarily affirmed three-judge district courts that followed circuit precedent, 188 but it also summarily affirmed a decision in which the three-judge district court explicitly stated that circuit precedent did not bind it. 189 By summarily affirming in both instances, the Court at least signaled that both approaches are correct, though without a written opinion it is difficult to know for sure. Three-judge district courts, as well as the litigants before them, are left lost at sea on this important question, which could dictate the outcome of cases involving the core aspects of our democracy.
In sum, although there is certainly a formalistic aspect to our proposal, in that courts generally should not feel bound by other courts that cannot review them, prudential and institutional considerations are also significant. At its core, tying the hands of three-judge district courts may increase the likelihood that these courts will reach decisions that fail to consider the substantive issues independently. This process could lead to results that the Supreme Court ultimately may find to be incorrect, yet the decision will affect upcoming elections in the meantime. In addition, the Supreme Court has obliquely affirmed both approachesapproving of decisions both where three-judge district courts have followed and not followed circuit precedent-creating doctrinal confusion in the process. Perhaps most importantly, Congress wanted three-judge district courts, to a degree, to exhibit independence and achieve more "legitimate" decisions for certain important cases by having multiple judges hear them from the outset. Unnecessarily binding these courts to circuit precedent runs contrary to that goal.
C. THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS AND THE HIERARCHY OF FEDERAL COURTS
To determine whether three-judge district courts must follow circuit caselaw, we must assess the relationship between trial and appellate courts in light of the goals behind the Three-Judge Court Act. As Professor Evan Caminker explains, in a system founded upon hierarchical precedent, "longstanding doctrine dictates that a court is always bound to follow a precedent established by a court 'superior' to it." 190 The word "superior" connotes that the higher court has some supervisory power over the lower court, such that the lower court must conform its decision to the superior court's precedent. As Professor Caminker explains:
The duty to obey hierarchical precedent tracks the path of review followed by a particular case as it moves up the three federal judicial tiers: A court must follow the precedents established by the court(s) directly above it. District courts must follow both Supreme Court decisions and those issued by whichever court of appeals has revisory jurisdiction over its decisions, and courts of appeals must heed Supreme Court decisions. However, a court can ignore precedents established by other courts so long as they lack revisory jurisdiction over it. Thus, a circuit court of appeals is not bound by decisions of coordinate circuit courts of appeals, and a district court judge may ignore the decisions of "foreign" courts of appeals as well as other district court judges, even within the same district.
191
Despite the universal acceptance of this system of judicial hierarchy, Professor Caminker persuasively argues that the doctrine, broadly applied, is not required as a matter of constitutional law.
192 Article III, creating one Supreme Court, strongly implies that all federal courts must follow Supreme Court precedent.
193
But the Constitution is less clear on whether and when lower federal courts must follow other lower federal courts. Article III, he points out, is opaque on hierarchy as such; it does not mandate the creation of the lower federal courts, and it suggests that Congress has considerable authority to regulate and limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of the lower courts it does create. 194 The doctrine, Caminker continues, is better thought of as primarily resting on a set of consequentialist and institutional (prudential) concerns, including judicial economy, deference to the presumably more proficient reasoning of multimember appellate courts accustomed to law development, and the need for uniform interpretation of the law. 195 Despite these somewhat shaky jurisprudential foundations, Caminker acknowledges that the "overwhelming consensus" of both judges and academics supports the "precedent model," under which "lower courts ought to define the law merely by interpreting existing precedents, without considering what their higher courts would likely do on appeal." 196 Assuming the validity of the rule-that "higher" courts bind lower court judges in the judicial hierarchy-then the converse will usually be true as well: absent a particular justification, judges need not follow decisions of courts that are not 197 This brings us to the ultimate question: is a three-judge district court inferior to a circuit court? From a formal hierarchical standpoint, the answer is no. In the federal court hierarchy, the only court that sits "above" the three-judge district court is the Supreme Court. Only the Supreme Court can hear an appeal from and affirm or reverse the three-judge district court's ruling. 198 The circuit court plays no role in the three-judge district court's operation beyond having the Chief Judge of the circuit appoint two of the judges and having at least one circuit judge serve on the panel. 199 Congress, the creator of three-judge district courts, gave the circuit court no other function with respect to these special tribunals. Once the ministerial responsibilities of convening the court are over, the circuit court plays no further role in the operation of the three-judge district court. 200 If a court must follow only the precedent of a court "superior" to it, then only Supreme Court precedent binds a three-judge district court.
D. PRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETERMINING THE PRECEDENTIAL WEIGHT OF CIRCUIT LAW ON THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS
If the conclusion that circuit precedent should not bind three-judge district courts is so obvious, then why is it a distinctly minority position among the courts that have addressed the issue? We can think of several explanations: (1) a desire to achieve uniformity, (2) the perceived benefits from the percolation of issues, and (3) efficiency. 201 Yet, upon further reflection, none of these justifications are convincing. Further, other exceptions to when one court must follow the law of another court even when the first court cannot overrule the second-such as the circuit court prior-panel rule-are inapplicable in this setting.
First, consider uniformity, or the desire to have district courts within a circuit rule in the same way. The only method to ensure this occurs is to require all district courts, including three-judge district courts, to follow circuit precedent. If a three-judge district court is not obliged to follow circuit precedent, then similarly (though not identically) situated litigants living in the same state (never mind the same circuit) arguably could have their rights litigated under different legal regimes. Recall the decision in Parker v. Ohio, the case in which a three-judge district court invoked Sixth Circuit precedent to reject the plaintiffs' request for the creation of "influence districts" to avoid the dilution of African-American voting strength. 202 Refusing to follow circuit precedent would have meant that the three-judge district court within the Sixth Circuit, and the Sixth Circuit itself, would have diverged on how to interpret this kind of claim under the Voting Rights Act.
But there are probably few cases in which a three-judge district court will find circuit precedent wrong. Those cases, however, involve the structure and functioning of our democracy, so although few in number, they are large in importance. By leaving the three-judge district court intact for reapportionment cases in 1976, Congress in effect designated those courts as specialized tribunals that could give greater attention to these particularly important cases. 203 Requiring 201 . In addition to the reasons we discuss in the text, there might be the more prosaic explanation of path dependence: most judges and lawyers may be comfortable with the majority rule and see no reason to argue to the contrary, to the extent they consider the issue at all. Thus, it is very common for threejudge district courts to cite and follow circuit precedent without even mentioning whether they believe circuit precedent binds them. 203. It is unclear why Congress left this exception in place when it abolished the rest of the jurisdiction of three-judge district courts. From the relatively scant legislative history on point, Congress apparently concluded that the perceived virtues of three-judge district courts, including multimember decisionmaking, arguably greater legitimacy, and prompt review when necessary by the Supreme Court, remained important for possibly high-profile and controversial reapportionment cases. See generally Douglas, supra note 16, at 462-63 (discussing the virtues and weaknesses of three-judge district courts); Mullen, supra note 184, at 376 (discussing some of the perceived problems of three-judge district courts 448 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:413 uniformity with circuit case law would hamper the ability of three-judge district courts to decide these significant issues independently. A desire for uniformity should not outweigh the primary goal behind Congress's creation of three-judge district courts. Encouraging percolation of issues might supply another reason to support a regime in which circuit precedent is binding on three-judge district courts. Often the Supreme Court will not grant certiorari in a case unless there is a circuit split and lower courts have considered various aspects of the issue. In this way, the issue can "percolate" among lower courts, which helps to inform the Supreme Court's analysis. 204 But if three-judge district courts are free agents unbound by circuit precedent, then possibly novel legal issues will be decided at the trial level, with a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court is then obliged to decide the case on the merits, unaided by the usual percolation of issues in circuit courts. 205 Although it is not clear whether the Supreme Court's decisions are "better" after percolation of an issue, there is at least some evidence that lower court percolation aids the Court's review. 206 But this concern overlooks the fact that percolation can occur among threejudge district courts for the topics that Congress deemed important enough for these specialized tribunals, including inherently political issues involving redistricting and campaign finance. Requiring three-judge district courts to follow circuit precedent would take away their ability to consider arguments independently, precluding the issues from percolating within the three-judge district courts that are actively reviewing them. Consider, for instance, the issue of whether and to what extent political gerrymandering claims are justiciable in federal court and, if so, the appropriate judicial standard to use. When the Supreme Court confronted that issue in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 207 the Court drew on the experience of various three-judge district courts, citing several that had rejected claims of partisan gerrymandering under the then-prevalent standard to show that the standard was unworkable. 208 The most recent round of litigation on this point during the 2017
Term in Gill v. Whitford 209 also stemmed from disparate resolutions of partisan gerrymandering claims among several three-judge district courts. 210 Thus, percolation still can occur for these issues where it is most appropriate: among threejudge district courts themselves.
Finally, perhaps it is more efficient to follow the law with which the members of any three-judge district court are most familiar and consider controlling precedent, namely, the law of that circuit, especially given the presumed superiority of circuit court decisionmaking. Circuit law is potentially better reasoned because three judges, instead of one, sit on the panel to decide a case, allowing multiple minds to shape a decision. Yet the purported superiority of resolving difficult legal issues by multimember appellate courts is irrelevant here given that threejudge district courts are, by definition, multimember tribunals. They already benefit from the considered judgment of three federal judges regardless of whether they must follow circuit precedent or not. In addition, although it may be more efficient for three-judge district courts to have caselaw they must follow-because being forced to adhere to binding precedent might make the decisionmaking process easier and faster-that efficiency would come with a significant trade-off in independence and legitimacy. There is nothing to suggest that Congress wanted three-judge district courts to give up all of their independence in favor of efficiency. The specialized court itself already benefits from a faster resolution process by skipping the court of appeals stage, so there is no reason to favor efficiency over all other goals, including the desire to allow three judicial minds to come to their own decision on an important issue.
Separate from these prudential considerations, perhaps three-judge district courts must follow circuit precedent, even though circuit courts cannot review their decisions, as a corollary to the courts of appeals' prior-panel rule, a prominent exception to the notion that only higher court caselaw is binding.
211 Under the prior-panel rule, a decision of a three-judge panel in a circuit court binds all future three-judge panels in that circuit; only the court sitting en banc (or the Supreme Court) may overrule a three-judge appellate panel's decision. 212 The 209. 138 S. Ct. 1916 Ct. (2018 Permitting only en banc courts to overrule circuit precedent may improve judicial administration because it reduces the number of intra-circuit conflicts and thereby provides greater certainty for district courts. 214 Thus, although not theorized deeply, the prior-panel rule seems to rest on concerns of uniformity and finality. 215 But, for several reasons, the justifications underlying the prior-panel rule do not apply to three-judge district courts and do not justify application of a similar rule in this context. Uniformity and finality are not as pressing for three-judge district courts, at least as compared to other virtues such as impartiality and legitimacy, given the specific subject matters at issue. The whole point of having certain cases, which mostly involve politics at a broad level, go to three judges at the outset is to avoid the reality or perception of ideology affecting the decision at the trial level, as well as to increase the likelihood of reaching the "correct" result early in the process. 216 If a three-judge district court must follow a prior appellate panel's decision, then that forced adherence might take away the perceived independence and corresponding greater legitimacy of the three-judge district court's decision. Because these cases are often viewed as inherently political, the threejudge district court should be unshackled from a prior decision that does not formally bind it. Three-judge district courts should have the independence to rule in the way they deem "correct," using the prior circuit law as highly persuasive but not formally binding. This is the best way to promote the ideals of unbiased and legitimate decisionmaking, which are particularly important virtues of the threejudge district court.
To be sure, the reverse is also possible: making three-judge district courts free agents could potentially increase ideologically-based decisionmaking, especially if prior circuit precedent, which the three-judge district court need not follow, is seen as unbiased. The judges on three-judge district courts could ignore circuit law to rule in a more explicitly ideological way. But they would have to do so while explaining their reasons for departing from that circuit precedent, which otherwise would be persuasive (though not mandatory). The requirement that judges explain their decisions would hopefully temper most judges' desire to ignore circuit precedent solely based on partisan motivation, as opposed to
